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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTE-CAL LAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff, Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 16017

ROBERT R. SATHER and
BONNIE LEE SATHER,
Defendants, Appellants
and Cross-Respondents.:

CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF OF APPEAL

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT OF
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
HONORABLE DAVID SAM, JUDGE

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involved the ownership in real property
situate in Uintah County, State of Utah.

Plaintiff claims

damages from defendants for taking possession of said property,
including punitive damages for willful and malicious misconduct in obtaining possession.

Defendants Sather claim

reimbursement from the plaintiff for money with interest
thereon advanced for plaintiff's benefit by defendants Sather
in connection with said land.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury on special interrogatories.

The jury found that plaintiff was the owner of the real
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property and was entitled to possession upon paying to
defendants Sather the sum of $21,500.00.

The jury further

found that a deed delivered to defendants Sather was to be
a security device and that defendant Robert R. Sather had
acted willfully and arbitrarily toward the plaintiff in
taking possession of the property, but awarded no damages to
the plaintiff as a consequence thereof.

After the jury was

discharged, the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion
for a new trial on the issue of damages and the defendants'
motion to add interest to the money found by the jury to be
due from the plaintiff to the defendants as being monies
advanced by Sather to defendant First Security Bank to obtain
a release of the deed pledged for security on the loan.

First

Security Bank has been released by plaintiff as a party to
this lawsuit after also being found guilty of willful misconduct.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON CROSS-APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a new trial on the issue of damages
in it's cross-appeal and to affirm the jury verdict as to the
amount owed Sather for his equitable interest in the real
property in question.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff agrees with the Statement of Facts set
forth in defendants' brief with the following corrections and
additions:
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-2-by the Utah State Library.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

One plaintiff, Pete J. Buffo, and the defendant,
Robert R. Sather, had known each other for about ten years
during which they had been friends, money had been loaned
back and forth for which no documentation was felt necessary.
(TR-130, 65, 106)

Defendant Sather negotiated with First

Security Bank on behalf of Buffo, the principal and president
of plaintiff Ute-Cal, who hereafter will jointly be referred
to as plaintiff, for the loans from which this lawsuit arose
(TR-61, 64, 65, lOS) and, on occasion, was authorized to
write checks on plaintiff's account with First Security Bank
(TR-83).

For purposes of these facts, Bonnie Lee Sather

only had a passive role as the wife of Robert R. Sather and
all facts as between plaintiff and the sathers are applicable
only to Robert R. Sather and hereafter reference to defendant
does not include Bonnie Sather as her only liability is to
re-convey to plaintiff.
It was at the instigation of defendant that the
trust deed note of October 11, 1972 (EX 22-P) was refinanced.
As of September 15, 1973, the note was current with all payments.
(TR-65, 80)

Plaintiff agreed to refinance the note because

defendant told him he needed $25,000 to buy diamonds and cover
some overdraft checks.

(TR-64, 65, 97)

Plaintiff was not aware that the $25,000 was used
to purchase a savings certificate and pledged as additional
security on plaintiff's $50,000 loan.

No pledge agreement

was ever presented and this additional security was not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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required by the Bank according to the information supplied
plaintiff.

The loan proceeds were distributed to Ute-Cal

without any indication that $25,000 was to be pledged back
to the Bank to secure the loan.

(EX 30-P; TR-G4, 65, 67).

Ute-Cal and Buffo signed an agreement dated
September 15, 1973,

(EX 3-P) which provided that if plaintiff

defaulted on the renewal $50,000 note and defendant subsequently paid the note as a guarantor, a deed to property
known as the Moss Ranch would be given to defendant.

The

September 15, 1973 agreement on a carbon copy bore a cancellation clause in handwriting signed by defendant which cancelled
any security arrangement as between plaintiff and defendant
regarding the escrowed warranty deed and permitted the return
of the warranty deed to plaintiff upon finalizing of the
renewal note with First Security Bank.

(TR-66)

Defendant

denied ever seeing the September 16, 1973, document of cancellation and only admitted that it bore his signature after
Robert Grube, a handwriting expert, was asked to authenticate
his signature (EX 26-P; TR-172, 173).
It was the understanding of plaintiff that both
he and defendant would be responsible for making the payments
on the $50,000 note

(TR-124, 125) and that if plaintiff could

make the first payment, defendant could probably handle the
next two (TR-98).

Plaintiff made the first payment of $5,000

plus $1,500 interest on December 10, 1973 (TR-138), and
assumed that defendant paid the $15,000 January payment.
Plaintiff was not aware the note was in default until March
Sponsored
S.J. Quinney Law visited
Library. Fundinghim
for digitization
provided by the Institute
of Museum and Library
Services
whenby the
defendant
in California
(TR-99).
Shortly
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4-

after the defendant returned to Utah he made demand upon
First Security Bank for the deed to the Moss Ranch (TR-194)
and paid First Security Bank $46,500, $25,000 from the
savings certificate and $21,500 personally.

Plaintiff

did make several offers to pay defendant for the re-conveyance
of the Moss Ranch (TR-107).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT TOWARDS
PLAINTIFF WAS SUFFICIENT FOR A FINDING BY THE JURY THAT
DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS CONDUCT.
In BEZNER V. CONTINENTAL DRY CLEANERS, INC. 584
P.2d 898 the Court stated that it would not disturb the
findings of the jury and the actions of the trial court
" ... unless it appears that there is substantial prejudicial
error, or that the evidence so clearly preponderates against
them that we are persuaded that injustice has result."
Since the defendant has made no showing of prejudice, he is
basing his appeal on a claimed lack of evidence for the jury
to make it's finding.
The jury was instructed that in order to find the
defendant acted with malice towards plaintiff, they must find
that defendant had a motive and willingness to vex, harass,
annoy or injure (Jury Instruction No. 25,

R-516

).

In

determining that the defendant had such a motive, the jury had
before it evidence that defendant:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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1.

Approached plaintiff with a request that plaintiff

refinance the $20,000 with First Security Bank to the sum of
$50,000 so that defendant could obtain $25,000 with which to
cover over-drafts and buy diamonds (TR-64, 65,
2.

97

).

Renegotiated with First Security Bank the renewing

of the note to the sum of $50,000 and agreed to act as a
personal guarantor using as security the trust deed note to
the Bank for the Moss Ranch (EX 24-P, 37-D; TR-67, 68).
3.

Informed plaintiff that the Bank would require

an additional agreement providing that if plaintiff defaulted
on the note and he was to pay it off, the Bank should deliver
the warranty deed it held to the Moss Ranch to defendant
(EX 3-P, TR-66).

It was conceded by defendant that this was

a security device for his benefit (TR-178).
4.

Agreed to cancel the warranty deed agreement

(EX 3-P) as soon as the bank papers were signed renewing the
note as an inducement to plaintiff to sign the warranty agreement (TR-66).
5.

Signed a document (EX 4-P) cancelling the

warranty deed agreement (EX 3-P) the day after the warranty
deed agreement was signed by plaintiff for the renewal of the
note, but failed to inform the Bank that the agreement had
been cancelled (TR 180, 202).
6.

Accepted a check from plaintiff for $25,000

from the proceeds of the $50,000 note, at 12% interest, and
immediately purchased a savings certificate for $25,000 at
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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5 1/2% interest and pledged it as security on the $50,000
note without informing plaintiff that this additional security
was supposedly required, a hard to understand Bank requirement.
Defendant didn't recall this transaction in his deposition
(TR-277).
7.

Failed to make the second payment of $15,000

on the $50,000 note as it carne due, after representing to
plaintiff that he would do so (.TR-99), so that the note went
into default.
8.

Without informing the plaintiff that the note

was in default, make arrangements to pay off the note with
the Bank,

(TR-98) and then attempted to encumber the Moss

Ranch to James Sheya on March 15, 1974, for $70,000 before
paying off the note to the Bank (EX 9-P, 72-P).

The pay off

on the note was in part the $25,000 savings certificate which
was deposited to defendant's bank account on March 18, 1974,
and cashed on March 25, 1974 (TR-27).
9.

Accepted the warranty deed to the Moss Ranch

from the Bank even though he had signed a document cancelling
the agreement.
10.

Took an assignment of the trust deed note

from the Bank and took possession of the Moss Ranch even
though the warranty deed was only intended as a security device.
11.

Took economic advantage of ownership in the form

of tax losses on the Moss Ranch in 1974, 1975, 1976 (EX 17,
18, 19-P) and royalty payments for mineral rights (TR-271 ) .
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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This record of activity, while disputed in some
points by the testimony of defendant, is sufficient to show
an intent by defendant to systematically gain control of
property belonging to plaintiff for a sum at a minimum of
less than one-half of it's appraised value, accomplished by
taking advantage of the trust and friendship which plaintiff
had in defendant (TR-61, 65, 66, 106, 130).
The jury was instructed that they were the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight of the evidence, had a right to consider the bias
interests and motives of the witnesses, as well as their
deportment,

c~ndor

and understanding of the facts in question.

(Jury Instruction No. 3, R-493).

The findings of the jury

that the action of defendant in gaining control of the Moss
Ranch amounted to willful and malicious conduct are certainly
justified by evidence before the jury and should be upheld.
POINT II
THE JURY HAD EVIDENCE BEFORE IT TO FIND THAT
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE THE SUM OF $21,500 FROM
THE PLAINTIFF FOR RETURN OF THE MOSS RANCH.
Plaintiff again points out to the Court that the
findings of the jury are to be upheld unless the evidence
so clearly preponderates against them that the Court concludes
substantial injustice has resulted.

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant argues in his brief, page 17, that:
" .•. there is absolutely no
to indicate when the money
repaid by defendant Sather
when defendant Sather paid
Bank in March of 1974."

evidence in the record
($25,000) was to be
or that it was due
off the First Security

Plaintiff testified that as part of the ongoing
relationship of friendship and trust which existed between
the parties, both parties were to be responsible for making
payments on the $50,000 note.

~he

arrangement was if he could

make the first payment of $5,000 ?lus $1,500 interest, defendant could probably handle t'l.e next t'\-10 payments or portions
thereof (TR-98, 99).

Having received no notice that the

second payment v1as delinquent, plaintiff testified that he
assumed defendant had the arrangements for repaying the loan
under control (TR-94).
In fact, defendant did not take care of the second
payment vlhich was due in January of 1974.

In March 1974 he

violated the trust and friendship of plaintiff by obtaining
the deed to the Moss Ranch in return for paying off the note
using $21,500 of his own money and the savings certificate
(TR-261).
Plaintiff submits that this is sufficient evidence
for the jury to base it's finding that plaintiff only owed
defendant $21,500 in return for oossession of the Moss Ranch.
POINT III
THE COURT liTAS ACTING 'HTHIN IT'S PROPER

AU~HORITY

IN FAILD!G TO GRN!T DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO ADD INTEREST:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A.

DEFENDANT SATHER WAIVED THE RIGHT TO INTEREST

BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE SPECIAL VERDICT BEFORE THE JURY
WAS DISMISSED.
B.

THE COURT, IN CONSIDERING DEFENDANT'S MOTION

TO ADD INTEREST, REVIEWED THE EVIDENCE AND FOUND THAT THE
JURY COULD HAVE INCLUDED INTEREST IN THE AMOUNT FOUND TO BE
DUE DEFENDANT.
A.

In LANGTON V. INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT, 26 U.2d

452, 491 P.2d 1211 (1971) is clear authority for the proposition
that a failure to object to an insufficiency in a special verdict
before the jury is dismissed constitutes a waiver of any
objection to that insufficiency.

In so holding the Court

quoted from BROWN V. REGAN 10 CAL.2d 519, 75 P.2d 1063, 1065-66
(1938):
" . . . The proper procedure where an informal or
insufficient verdict has been returned is for the
trial court to require the jury to return for further
deliberation .
. . . It is well established by numerous authorities
that, when a verdict is not in the proper form
and the jury is not required to clarify it, any
error in said verdict is waived by the party relying
thereon who at the time of it's rendition failed to
make any request that it's informality or uncertainty
be corrected . . . "
This holding was followed in COHN v. J.C. PENNY

co., r

537 P.2d 306 (1975), stating that where counsel failed to object
to a special verdict and have the jury sent back for further
deliberations, counsel had waived any error in the special verd::
In the case at hand the jury was asked if plaintiff
was required to make a valid tender of $46,500, being the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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amount paid by defendant to obtain the release of the
warranty deed and assignment of trust deed and trust note
from the Bank or any part thereof to defendant in order
to regain possession of the Moss Ranch, which the jury
answered in the affirmative (Special Verdict No. 12 R-600.)
The jury was then asked if the plaintiff was entitled to
the return of the Moss Ranch.

It again answered "yes"

(Special Verdict No. 13, R-600.) It was obvious that this
special verdict was insufficient and at the request of the
plaintiff after these verdicts were received and read,
two additional interrogatories were submitted to the jury
for their further deliberation.
"14.

Since your answer to Interrogatory No. 13

is yes, does the plaintiff owe any sum of money to the
defendant Sather?
15.

Yes

x

No

I f yes, how much? $21,500 "

(R-601)

The defendant waived his opportunity to question
the jury as to how they reached this sum or if the jury
considered or included interest in that sum or to have
additional interrogatories inquire of the jury to clarify
answer No. 15, i.e.: "plus or including interest, or plus
interest at

% rate".

Apparently defendant assumes that

because no specific references to interest were made in the
special interrogatories or in the answers, the jury failed
to include interest in arriving at the sum found to be owed

-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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defendant.

Assuming this to be true, the verdict was defective

on it's face and the defendant, by failing to object before
the jury was dismissed, waived his right to object to such
defect.

Since defendant renewed a $20,000 note for $50,000

at 12% interest and received 5 l/2% interest on his savings
certificate for one-half of the note, the jury just as reasonably could have assumed that each party should pay it's own
interest expense.

Further, but for the inducement to renew

the note by defendant, plaintiff would not have been in
the financial bind created by defendant's acts and therefore
waiver of interest from the date of paying the Bank in March,
1974 until date of jury verdict was a proper result.
B.

THE COURT AFTER REVIEWING THE EVIDENCE IN

CONSIDERING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO ADD INTEREST FOUND THAT
THE JURY INCLUDED INTEREST IN THE AMOUNT DUE DEFENDANT.
RULE 49(a) U.R.C.P. provides in part as follows:
"The Court shall give to the jury, such explanation
and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted
as may be necessary to enable the jury to make it's
findings upon each issue.
If in so doing, the
Court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings
or by the evidence, each party waives his right
to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted, unless
before the jury retires, he demands it's submission
to the jury. As to any issue omitted without such
demand, the Court may make a finding; or if it fails
to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding
in accordance with the judgment of the special verdi~
Pursuant to the above Rule, defendant submitted
a proposed judgment on the verdict to the court below relative
to the award of interest together with a motion to add interest
After considering the above proposals and motions, the court

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stated:
"As to the issue of interest, the court after
reviewing the evidence and the case authority
submitted by counsel finds that the jury included
interest in the amount found to be due to the
defendants Sather ... It is the opinion of the
Court that the jury was alert and considerate
of all questions before it being in deliberation
for the time as noted above (about 10 hours).
The Court in reviewing their answers to the
questions on special verdict form finds that
a portion of the interest assessed to the
defendant Sather by the defendant First Security
Bank was included in the amount found to be
due the Defendant Sather . . . " (R-669).
It should again be noted that the defendant
collected approximately $1,000 interest on the savings
certificate when it was cashed in (TR-252) and had the use
or rental value of the Moss Ranch from March, 1974 to
the time of trial.
The court below acknowledged that it had authority
under RULE 49(a), U.R.C.P. and the case of MOURIKAS V.
VARDIANOS, 169 F. 2d 53, to award interest on the amount
found due but declined to do so because, as MOURIKAS
points out:
" ... ordinarily the question of whether or not
interest should be allowed and from what date
is for the jury"
and was of the opinion the jury had included interest in
it's award (R-667).
As pointed out above, defendant had an opportunity
to request a breakdown of the amount due or failed to do so.
Having failed to do so, the defendant waived his right to
object to the insufficiency of the verdict.

The verdict of

theby thejury
andLawthe
rulings
of the
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court
areandto
beServices
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every benefit of the doubt and are to be upheld so long as they
are supported by:
" ... evidence which, together with the fair inferences
that may be drawn therefrom, reasonable minds could
conclude as the jury did." GORDON V. PROVO CITY,
15 UT 2d 287, 391 P.2d 430 (1964)
Plaintiff submits there is substantial evidence to support
the verdict of the jury and the ruling of the trial court
denying defendant's motion to add interest and this Court
should deny defendant's appeal.
PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-APPEAL
THE EVIDENCE REQUIRED A FINDING BY THE JURY THAT
PLAINTIFF SUFFERED DAMAGES FROM THE WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS
CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT IN TAKING TITLE TO THE MOSS RANCH
AND THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED IT'S DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES.
"The fundamental principle of damages is to restore
the injured party to the position he would have been
in had it not been for the wrong of the other party."
HILL V. VARNER 4 UT 2d 166, 241 P.2d 448 citing
PARK V. MOORMAN MANFACTURING CO., 241 P.2d 914
RULE 59(a} U.R.C.P. was created to give the trial
judge authority to grant a new trial when:
"It seems clear that the jury has missapplied or
failed to take into account proven facts, or misunderstood or disregarded the law; or made findings
clearly against the weight of the evidence."
WELLMAN V. NOBLE 12 UT 2d 350, 336 P.2d 701 at 703
c~ting HOLMES V. NELSON 7 UT 2d 435 at 437, 441;
326 P.2d 722 at 725.
In BODON V. SUHRMANN, 8 UT 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826,
the Court ordered the defendant to accept an additor to $500
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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or face a new trial after the jury awarded the plaintiff
only $100 in damages.

The Court noted that it was undisputed

the plaintiff had lost a total of $64.00 in out of pocket
damages, leaving only $31.00 as general damages for the "pain,
distress and inconvenience of having the disease."

It then

said:
"We affirm the responsibility of this Court to
be indulgent toward the verdict of the jury,
and not to disturb it so long as it is within
the bounds of reason . . . also that it is
primarily the prerogative and duty of the trial
court to pass upon the adequacy of the verdict
and to order any necessary modification thereof.
Nevertheless, when the verdict is outside the
limits of any reasonable appraisal of damages
as shown by the evidence, it should not be permitted to stand, and if the trial court fails
to rectify it, we are obligated to make the
correction on appeal."
327 P.2d at 830 citing
JENSEN V. DENVER & R.G.R.R. CO. 44 Ut. 100,
138 P. at 1192.
Plaintiff submits that the instant case falls
within RULE 59(a) (6) U.R.C.P. as interpreted in BODEN V.
SUHRMANN.

Defendant testified that he received "one or two

royalty payments of $260.00" for mineral rights during his
occupancy of the Moss Ranch (TR-271).

While the exact amount

of royalties defendant received may be uncertain, it is undisputed that he did receive royalties and had possession
of the property.

The jury's finding of no damages suffered

by plaintiff is to this extent outside the limits of any
reasonable appraisal of damages as shown by the evidence,
against the law, and the fundamental principal of damages.
These facts are similar to the Utah case of HILL V.
VARNER, Supra. in which there was nothing in the record
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refuting the fact of physical damage which the trial court
had determined was due to the negligence of the defendant.
The trial court awarded only nominal damages because the
actual amount of physical damage incurred had not been
established to it's satisfaction.

On appeal the case was

reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages
alone because:
. the injured party had not been restored to
the position it would have been had it not been for
wrong of the other party."
The jury's verdict in the instant case is especially
inadequate because by finding that there were no actual
damages suffered by the plaintiff the jury was prevented
from considering whether punitive damages should be assessed
against the defendant for his "willful and malicious" conduct.
The jury was instructed that it could consider:
"In any punitive damage awarded to plaintiff
it's attorney's fee incurred in bringing this
civil action in the amount of which was $11,500."
(Jury Instruction No. 24, R-515)
The jury's verdict not only fails to restore the injured
party to it's original position, but thereafter allows the
defendant by his willful and malicious actions, to force
plaintiff to incur $11,500 in attorney fees to regain control
over property which was rightfully theirs.
The reason for limiting a retrial to a single issue
is set forth in 58 AM, JUR. 2d, NEW TRIAL, § 22, P.210.
"The guiding principle is that although a verdict
ought not to stand which is tainted with illegality,
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there ought to be but one fair trial upon any issue,
and that parties ought not to be compelled to try
anew a question once disposed of by a decision
against which no illegality can be shown.
Thus the
parties and the state have been saved the expense,
annoyance, and delay of a retrial of issues once
settled by a trial as to which no reversible error
appears."
In 58 AM JUR. 2d NEW TRIAL § 27 the principles
governing the propriety of limiting a new trial to the issue
of damages are expressed:
"As in any other case, to justify limiting a new
trial to the single issue of damages it must appear
that the issue is clearly severable from the other
issues in the case, and that a retrial limited to
the issue of damages may be had \vithout injustice
. . . Yet, when the Court is convinced upon review
of the whole case that the jury have settled the
issue as to responsibility fairly and upon sufficient
evidence - so that disassociated from other questions
it ought to stand as the final adjudication of the
rights of the parties - and that there has been such
error in the determination of damages as to require
the setting aside of the verdict, a new trial as
to damages alone may properly be ordered although
this cuts off evidence which, if introduced with
respect to other issues, might mitigate damages,
all such evidence being admissable as to damages."
See also PHILLIPS V. CLEEVER 187 P.2d 80 (Cal.)
The verdict in the case at hand was divided into
fifteen special verdicts so that the liability of defendant
was established without equivocation.

The various issues

were separated making it possible to limit a new trial to
damages without injustice.

Questions 1, 2, 3 and 13 establish

the liability of the defendant.

Questions 8 and 10 establish

that the defendant acted willfully and maliciously.

Questions

12, 13 14 and 15 dealt with the right of return of the Moss
Ranch to the plaintiff, while questions 4, 5, 6 and 7 dealt
with
actual damages and 9 and 11 with punitive damages.
The
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question of damages could be retried without considering
the issue of liability or the mechanics of the return of the
Moss Ranch to the plaintiff.
If in a new trial it was determined that actual
damages should be assessed, the Court could admit all evidence
of the willfulness and malice of the defendants in order to
determine whether punitive damages should be assessed.
is analogous to a comparative negligence situation.

This

In

58 AM. JR. 2d NEW TRIAL § 27 P. 213 the general rule is
expressed thusly:
"Where the verdict on the first trial establishes
the responsibility of the defendant the new trial
may be confined to the issue of damages, but the
Court will admit all evidence bearing on the negligence of the defendant and the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff so as to permit the
application of the rule on comparative negligence."
(if applicable)
See CASTER V. MOELLER 176 NEB.
446, 126 N.W. 2d 485
There have been a number of cases in which courts
have ordered a new trial to be held on the issue of exemplary
or punitive damages or in conjunction with a new trial limited
to the issue of damages, punitive damages have also been
retried.

In FOSTER V. KEATING 261 P.2d 529 (CAL) and MONAHAN

V. METROPOLITAN NATIONAL BANK 500 P.2d 158 (COLO 1972) the
Courts held that where both compensatory and exemplary damages
could be awarded and a new trial was ordered on the issue of
compensatory damages, a redetermination of exemplary damages
would also be required.

Following this reasoning, in the

instant case if a new trial is awarded on the issue of damages
it should include a redetermination of both compensatory
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A final issue which must be dealt

with on appeal

is the possibility that the plaintiff has waived his right
to ask for a partial new trial by failing to ask the jury to
consider the damage issue further beforeit's dismissal.
Restating LANGTON V. INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT COMPANY, Supra,:
"When a verdict is not in proper form and the jury
is not required to clarify it, any error in said
verdict is waived by the party relying thereon
who at the time of it's rendition failed to make
any request that it's informality or uncertainty
be corrected."
A close reading of LANGON and COHN, Supra, along
with SUNILAND CORP. V. RADCLIFFE 576 P.2d 805, indicates
that the purpose for this ruling was to control the termination
of litigation and prevent a party from gaining an unfair
strategic advantage by gaining a new trial before a more
sympathetic jury.

See LANGTON 491 P.2d at 1215.

The

defect must be apparent on the face of the verdict so that
counsel would be aware that the verdict is deficient before
waiver occurs.

See dissention opinion of Justice Manghan in

SUNILAND 567 P.2d at 850.
In the instant case, it would appear at first glance
that an award of no general damages would be a patently
insufficient verdict, putting counsel on notice.

However,

this is a complex case with several issues.

The original

verdict was deficient in more than one area.

Counsel for

the plaintiff did send the jury back to clarify it's verdict
by answering two additional special interrogatories on money
owed defendant (TR-323, 328).
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However, the jury having found plaintiff had sustained no
general damages and therefore could not award punitive damages
as heretofore discussed, plaintiff's only alternative was
RULE 59(a) U.R.C.P.

Plaintiff's counsel therefore sought

to permit the trial judge to correct the no damages error
in a motion for a new trial which was denied notwithstanding
the clear and uncontroverted evidence of the receipt of
royalty payments and use of the Moss Ranch by plaintiff
for over four years.
Unlike LANGTON there is no evidence that this was
a compromise verdict which compelled correcting. The jury
was consistent in it's findings in favor of the plaintiff
in establishing the willful and malicious nature of defendant's
actions and the right of the plaintiff to a return of property.
For the Court to have directed the jury to return and reconsider
a specific interrogatory on which an unequivocal negative
finding had been made could well constitute a comment on
the evidence by the trial judge or a directing of a verdict
by the trial judge that damages occurred, either of which
at that point in a jury trial would probably constitute
reversible error.
CONCLUSION
The verdict of the jury with respect to it's
finding of willful and malicious action on the part of
defedant Robert R. Sather is fully supported by evidence
submitted to the jury for it's consideration.

Likewise

the verdict of the jury with respect to it's finding that
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the defendant is entitled to the sum of $21,500 is supported
by competent and substantial evidence and this Court should
uphold the jury in it's findings.
The refusal of the court below to add interest to
the amount due from the plaintiff is a correct interpretation
of the law and supported by evidence that the jury considered
interest in determining the amount due to the defendant from
plaintiff.

In any event, the defendant waived any defect in

the jury's verdict and finding on the amount defendant could
recover by failing to object to the jury's findings before
the jury was dismissed.
The verdict of the jury with respect to it's finding
of no damages suffered by plaintiff from the willful and
malicious conduct of defendant in gaining control of the Moss
Ranch is outside the limits of a reasonable appraisal of
damages and should not be permitted to stand.

The court below

abused it's discretion in refusing to grant a new trial on the
issue of damages and the rules of the court below on that
motion should be reversed and this case remanded for a new
trial on the issue of damages.
Respectfully submitted,

McRAE AND DeLAND
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
317 West First South
Vernal, Utah 84078
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